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BOOK REVIEW
Empiricism in Bankruptcy
BOOK REVIEW OF TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As We Forgive Our Debtors
Robert A. Hillmant
Reflecting the "consumer revolution" of the 1970s, 1 the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("the Reform Act") 2 contained numer-
ous measures designed to solidify the fresh-start policy of consumer
bankruptcy. Eligibility for a discharge, for example, basically re-
quired either the liquidation of the debtor's often valueless, non-
exempt assets in Chapter 7,3 or the good-faith proposal of a plan to
repay all or a portion of debts from future income in Chapter 13.4
Influenced by theories of consumer incompetence at measuring the
risks and consequences of default and by perceptions of aggressive
creditor behavior, Congress perceived a national interest in rehabili-
tating debtors. 5
Following enactment of the Reform Act, the number of con-
sumer bankruptcy filings increased dramatically.6 Predictably, cred-
itor interests claimed the Reform Act invited abuse by debtors who
were capable of paying their debts. Moreover, a study of consumer
bankruptcy substantiated this allegation. 7 In response, Congress
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
I thank Ted Eisenberg for reading a draft of this book review.
1 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1978); Charles G. Hallinan, The
"Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory,
21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 71-89 (1986).
2 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 721-728 (1988); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 25-35 (1989) [hereinafter DEBTORS].
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1330 (1988). Chapter 13, therefore, shielded the debtor's
assets from creditors. DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 33-39. Both Chapters 7 and 13 envision
some repayment to secured creditors. Id. at 138.
5 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th. Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1978).
6 The number of consumer bankruptcies has more than doubled in the last ten
years. DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 3.
7 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PUR-
DUE UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (Monograph Nos. 23-24 1982). This
study reported that in 1981 debtors could have paid over $1 billion of discharged debt
and that almost one-third of the debtors could have paid "'a significant part'" of their
debts. See DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 5-6 (quoting the study).
1095
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
passed pro-creditor amendments in 1984 narrowing debtor protec-
tion. Under the new rules, courts could deny a Chapter 7 discharge
if relief would constitute "substantial abuse" of the chapter.8 In ad-
dition, the debtor must devote all "disposable income" to creditor
payments pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. 9
Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook now join the fray
with the publication of As We Forgive Our Debtors, an empirical study
of consumer bankruptcy debtors and creditors. The authors report
that few of the consumer debtors in their study could pay their debts
and that income interruptions best explain these debtors' travails.' 0
In consequence, they infer that few consumer debtors "abuse"
bankruptcy." The authors present an alternative explanation for
the boom in consumer bankruptcies during the 1980s: irresponsi-
ble lending by the credit industry. 12
As We Forgive Our Debtors is an important contribution to the
consumer bankruptcy debate. As the authors point out, Congress
drafted the Reform Act without adequate information concerning
either the circumstances of, or the individuals involved in, consumer
bankruptcy. 13 This book helps fill the void. It is loaded with vital
data that inform the issues and clarify potential responses to the
consumer bankruptcy problem.
As We Forgive Our Debtors is clearly written as well. The authors
carefully explain their methodology in the text; their arguments and
conclusions are distinct and understandable. A section on "policy
implications" concludes each chapter, highlighting the significance
of that chapter's data. Readers will find useful information in plenti-
ful (but unimposing) statistical tables and in comprehensive
footnotes.
Although the authors have painstakingly collected and analyzed
their data and have enriched the debate about consumer bank-
ruptcy, the book also illustrates some of the inevitable limitations of
empirical work. While they often engage in strong advocacy, the
authors readily acknowledge the inability of their data to reflect fully
an accurate picture of consumer bankruptcy. In addition, their data
fail to resolve such pressing normative issues as whether debtors
8 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) (substantial abuse test).
9 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1988) (disposable income test).
10 See infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
I1 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 63 ("almost all debtors are in deep financial trouble");
id. at 212 (no more than "about 3-9% of the [Chapter 7] debtors ... are suspects for
further.., investigation").
12 Id. at 322-25.
13 Id. at 15-17. The authors point out that the government still does not publish
statistics concerning the amount of debt discharged in bankruptcy, the incomes and as-
sets of debtors, the types of creditors, or the future prospects of parties that go through
bankruptcy. Id. at 4.
1096 [Vol. 75:1095
"abuse" bankruptcy in sufficient numbers to justify reform or
whether the law should fault the credit industry for its easy-credit
policy. Despite these lingering doubts and unanswered questions,
the reader will gain a much dearer picture of the people and the
challenges of consumer bankruptcy.
I'
THE FINDINGS
Various criteria may be used to evaluate the success of an em-
pirical project. Was the authors' hypothesis dear and distinct? Did
they compile pertinent information? Was their methodology
sound? Does their data support their conclusions?
Based on these measures, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's
contribution is significant.' 4 To test whether debtors abuse bank-
ruptcy, the authors investigated who is utilizing bankruptcy, why
they are employing it, and who are their creditors. For example,
what are the debtors' occupations? How much do they earn? Are
they struggling to make ends meet or are they irresponsible "high
rollers"? Can they pay their debts once they have incurred them?
Do banks and other creditors aggressively market credit without re-
gard to the nature of their debtors and the probability of
repayment?
To answer these and other questions, the authors sampled
about 150 Chapters 7 and 1315 bankruptcy filings by natural persons
in 1981 in each of the federal judicial districts in Texas, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania, 16 for a total sample of 1502 debtors. 17 The authors
obtained their information from the bankruptcy forms completed by
the sample debtors. 8 Their data supply a wealth of information
14 I leave a technical critique of the author's methodology to others more qualified
than myself.
15 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
16 The authors did not study random federal districts from around the United
States. Instead, they studied debtors in all the districts in each of three states. Although
the same state law applied to all debtors within each state, various districts "seemed to
represent very different local bankruptcy systems." DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 18. The
authors selected Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania "because they varied in interesting
ways," such as exemption policy, economic viability (contrasting "the booming Sunbelt
and the decaying Rustbelt"), and unemployment rates. Id. at 18-19.
17 The authors gathered information from 1547 bankruptcy cases. They eliminated
information from 18 cases because they were too incomplete. They also eliminated 27
"outliers," extreme cases that would skew the entire study. Id. at 64. Fifty-eight percent
of the cases sampled were joint bankruptcy filings by married couples. The authors
therefore studied information from 2409 individuals in bankruptcy. Id. at 17.
18 The forms include information on the debtors' "assets, income, debts, employ-
ment, migration history," and on the creditors. Id at 20. For a list of the information
on the forms, see id at 17-18. The authors collected the data between 1983 and 1986.
Id. at 19. Not all of the cases were complete within that time frame. Id.
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that contradicts the view that consumers abuse bankruptcy. As a re-
sult, no legislator, commentator, or lawyer involved in consumer
bankruptcy can afford to ignore these data.' 9
A. Who Are The Debtors?
The authors found that the debtors were similar to the general
population in many ways. For example, about 90% of the debtors
in the sample were wage earners, as compared to 92% of the
general population. 20 Furthermore, the wage-earning debtors
"work[ed] in the same occupations and industries as most Ameri-
cans." 2 1 Surprisingly, the debtors' rate of unemployment at the
time of filing was comparable to the nationwide rate in 1981, about
7%.22 Fifty-two percent of the debtors owned their homes, com-
pared to 64% of the general population. 23 Except in rare cases, the
debtors were not burdened with unusual amounts of medical debt.24
Only a few debtors (about 8%) had filed for bankruptcy previ-
ously, 25 laying to rest fears of an army of repeat bankruptcy players.
Finally, the debtors' credit card debt was not extraordinary. 26
19 As We Forgive Our Debtors has already stimulated a symposium. See As We Forgive
Our Debtors, 65 IND. LJ. 1 (1989). The contributors elaborate upon several interesting
issues raised by the book.
20 Id at 85. Self-employed debtors comprised 10.4% of the sample and 7.3% of
the general population. Id at 111. Another 9.6% of the sample were formerly self-
employed. Id Thus, about 20% of the debtors may have failed as entrepreneurs.
These debtors were responsible for 45% of the total debt. Id at 118.
21 Id at 85. The sample included 18% craftworkers, 11% professional or technical
workers, 9% nonfarm laborers, 12% semiskilled workers, and 12% managers or admin-
istrators. Id at 86. Only 73% of the debtors set forth information on both occupation
and industry. Id at 104 n.4. This statistic worries Professor Girth. See Marjorie L.
Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation for Individuals, 65 IN).
LJ. 17, 30 (1989).
22 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 86. An additional 10% of the sample either did not
respond or responded unclearly to the employment question. Id at 86; see also infra note
33.
23 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 129. The mean value of the debtors' homes was
$50,000; the mean value for the general population's homes was $56,100. Id.
The homeowning debtors earned less and owed more than homeowners in the gen-
eral population. Their average net worth was $-13,337. Id. at 141. Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook hypothesize that the homeowners' fortunes fell after they purchased
their homes. Id. at 135.
24 Id at 168 ("at most only 1% to 2% of the debtors in bankruptcy are demonstra-
bly there because of catastrophic medical losses"); see also id at 170.
25 Id. at 192.
26 Id at 189. All-purpose credit card debt surprisingly accounted for only 3% of
the total debt. Id. at 306. According to the authors, credit card 'junkies" consisted of,
at most, 15% of the wage earners in the sample. Id. at 184-85.
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook also present interesting data concerning home-
owners, entrepreneurs, women, and other debtor sub-groups. For example, women
debtors earned significantly less than male debtors. Id. at 151. The mean income for
families in bankruptcy headed by a male was $18,000; the mean income for such families
1098 [Vol. 75:1095
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Despite these similarities to the general population, the debtors
earned less than their counterparts in each occupation. 27 Since the
debtors apparently did not occupy the lowest paying jobs within
their respective occupations, 28 the authors hypothesize that signifi-
cant income interruptions may explain the salary deficiencies. 29 The
Chapter 7 wage earners'30 short job tenure,31 volatile income,3 2 and
even their rate of unemployment,3 3 the authors assert, substantiate
their hypothesis that "a majority" of these debtors suffered from a
serious interruption in income before bankruptcy. 34
B. Can The Debtors Pay?
Not surprisingly, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found that
their sample debtors were in poor financial shape at the time of their
filings.3 5 Both the mean ($15,779) and median ($14,974) family in-
comes of the debtors were less than two-thirds of the national
figures.3 6 Although debtors in the sample and the general popula-
tion had comparable home-mortgage debt,3 7 the median non-
mortage consumer debt in the sample was $10,800, compared to
headed by a single female was $10,600. Id. at 152. See generally Zipporah Batshaw Wise-
man, Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond, 65 IND. LJ. 107 (1989).
27 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 91.
28 Id. at 91-95. The similarity of occupational prestige between the debtors and the
general population tends to rebut the theory. Id. at 91. The authors also "standardized"
the debtors' income data to reach this conclusion. Id. at 91-95.
29 "If a plumber makes $20,000 a year, a plumber laid off for four months would
make only $14,300 .... " Id. at 95.
30 The authors looked at the Chapter 7 debtors because they were required to re-
port more income information. Id. at 96.
31 The median job tenure was 1.5 years for the Chapter 7 debtors in the sample,
compared to 3.2 years for all workers over 16 years of age. Id. at 96.
32 Forty-two percent of the Chapter 7 wage-earning debtors had income swings of
more than 20% during the two years before filing. Id. at 100. More than half of these
swings were income increases. Id. at 99. Nevertheless, these debtors' incomes were so
low in 1979 (the median 1979 income was $11,000) that the authors conclude that the
data "are consistent with the hypothesis of income interruption due to unemployment
or layoff." Id. at 99.
33 The authors included both unemployed and "probably unemployed" wage earn-
ers among the ranks of the unemployed for purposes of their "income interruption"
hypothesis. ME. at 96.
34 Id at 100.
35 Id at 64-77. Nevertheless, the authors' study proves much more than the obvi-
ous. Although the conclusion that most debtors are in poor financial shape when they
file for bankruptcy may not be surprising, the nature of the debate about consumer
bankruptcy--do debtors abuse bankruptcy?-makes the authors' findings relevant and
important.
36 Id at 65. The median national family income in 1981 was $22,400. The national
mean was $25,800. Id Nevertheless, 14% of the debtors had incomes above the na-
tional mean. Id
37 The median home-mortgage debt nationally in 1983 was $21,000, whereas the
median home-mortgage debt within the sample was $23,714. Id. at 68-69.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
$2,400 in the general population in 1983 (the closest year for which
statistics were available for comparison) s38 The average debtor had
$23,034 of secured debt and $15,498 of unsecured debt, the latter
figure alone nearly equaling the average debtor's annual income.39
The median debtor-family owed debts equal to about one year and
five months' worth of income.40 More than three-quarters of the
debtors were insolvent, with debts exceeding their assets.4 1 In fact,
the median debtor had a net worth of $-8, 100, whereas the median
net worth of a person in the general population in 1983 was
$24,600.42
Can debtors in such financial straits pay their debts? Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook think not. The authors studied the wage
earners in their sample who filed in Chapter 7 or 13. They excluded
the self-employed or formerly self-employed, who were generally
less able to repay their debts than the wage earners.43 The authors
report that over 87% of the Chapter 7 wage earners could pay noth-
ing by selling all of their assets other than their homes.44 In addi-
tion, more than 90% of the Chapter 7 wage earners who owned
homes could pay nothing if they sold their homes.45 According to
the authors' calculations, only about 9% of the Chapter 7 wage
earners could pay all their debts in three years by contributing up to
40% of their incomes to a hypothetical Chapter 13 repayment plan
while living on a low budget.46 About 16% of the wage earners ac-
tually utilizing Chapter 13 could pay all their debts in three years by
contributing up to 40%o of their incomes to repayment while living
38 Id at 66, 68-69. Nonmortage consumer debt averaged $20,600 per family in the
sample, compared to $5,400 in the general population. Id
39 Id at 64, 69. Extreme cases skew these figures, of course. The median amount
of unsecured debt for the sample was $7,052. Id
40 Id. at 74. The authors combined both spouses' incomes for family members. Id.
at 73. The mean debt was much higher (three years and two months), showing that
extreme cases raised the debt/income ratio. Id. at 74.
41 Id at 71. But 16% had a positive net worth of more than $5000. Id. at 71-72.
The standards utilized by debtors for measuring the value of their assets are unknown.
42 Id. at 71. The mean net worth of the debtors was $-13,900; the mean net worth
of the general population in 1983 was $66,100. Id The 1983 survey omitted
automobiles and home furnishings. Id. at 70.
43 Id. at 201.
44 Id. at 203. The authors assumed $5000 of exempt property for each debtor. Id.
45 Id. at 205. This assumes a homestead exemption of $10,000 and a market value
return of 70% for the homes. Id. at 204.
46 Id. at 212. The authors determined each Chapter 7 wage earner's income and
subtracted projected federal income taxes, home mortgage and other payments to se-
cured creditors, and the fee to the hypothetical Chapter 13 trustee. Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook also deducted a "low" household budget based on statistics published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The low budget was not a "poverty" budget, but
applied a minimal standard rather than average costs. The low budget for 1981, before
taxes, was $15,323. The authors applied the remainder of the income to the unsecured
debt. Id. at 210.
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on the same low budget.47 The latter finding, together with other
studies supporting the relative lack of success of Chapter 13 pay-
ment plans,48 lead the authors to conclude that the benefits of
Chapter 13 may be outweighed by the costs of "waste[d] money and
mental anguish" suffered by debtors attempting to perform impossi-
ble plans.49
C. The Creditors
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found that the creditors were
a diverse group.50 They included members of the consumer credit
industry such as credit card issuers, banks, private mortgage compa-
nies, savings and loans, gasoline companies, stores, finance compa-
nies, credit unions, and car finance companies. 51 Other creditors
included family members, co-workers, doctors, utility companies,
and tort victims. 52
Although the creditors were a mixed group, members of the
consumer credit industry loaned nearly 87% of the wage earners'
debt.5 3 Banks extended the largest amount of credit (22.9%), of
which more than two-thirds was secured, followed by private mort-
gage companies (17.4%o), savings and loans (14.2%), general fi-
nance companies (13.9%), and stores (10.8%).54 The latter, which
lent exclusively on an unsecured basis, represented the largest un-
secured lenders, holding almost 37% of the unsecured debt.55 As a
whole, not surprisingly, long-term creditors and those making large
loans were secured to a far greater extent than short-term and
small-loan creditors. 56
From their data, the authors conclude that the best criterion for
predicting the risk of bankruptcy is the ratio of debt to income.57
Nevertheless, the authors assert that few consumer-credit-industry
47 Id. at 214. The authors could not report actual final results of the Chapter 13
cases because many of their cases had not been completed when analyzed. Id. at 215.
This weakens their conclusion. See Girth, supra note 21, at 39-40; see also infra note 75.
48 E.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. 36, 52 (1981) (statement of Claude Rice), cited in DEBTORS, supra note 3,
at 229 n.33.
49 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 223. But see Girth, supra note 21, at 38-48.
50 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 273.
51 Id. at 302.
52 Id at 274.
53 Id at 303. The debt totaled $27,768,100, of which over $10,000,000 was un-
secured. Id. at 304. Reaffirmations by debtors and Chapter 13 pay-back plans reduce
the actual amount of unsecured-debt losses. Id. at 319.
54 Id. at 307.
55 Id.
56 Id at 312 (large loans); id. at 309 (long-term loans).
57 Id. at 313. An additional factor is sharp changes in income shortly before bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 314.
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creditors lending to wage earners seek that information on their
credit applications. 58 Nor do many creditors systematically review
their short-term loans before making additional extensions of
credit.59 The creditors apparently have concluded that the costs of
determining whether debtors are bad credit risks outweigh the
benefits.60
D. Summary of the Authors' Conclusions
As We Forgive Our Debtors finds that consumer debtors in bank-
ruptcy represent a cross-section of Americans, living above the pov-
erty line, but earning less than others in comparablejobs. Although
their medical debt is relatively insignificant, many have suffered in-
come interruptions shortly before bankruptcy. The debtors have se-
rious financial difficulties and, for the most part, are unable to pay
their debts. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suggest that members
of the consumer credit industry, the source of most of the spiraling
debt, do not systematically employ the best information when deter-
mining the likelihood of loan repayment.
II
THE LIMrrs OF THE DATA
Although providing a wealth of information, the authors' data
fail to resolve some key questions. 61 As already mentioned, the
study examined cases filed in only three states.6 2 As the authors
point out, there are benefits to investigating all of the judicial dis-
tricts in individual states. For example, if the rate of filings in Chap-
ters 7 and 13 depended on economic incentives, one would expect a
consistent proportion of Chapter 7 and 13 filings in each judicial
district within a sample state, where statutory incentives such as as-
set exemption levels in Chapter 7 are constant and where, according
to the authors' data, there are no important economic distinctions
among the debtors. 63 Nevertheless, the rate of filings of Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 proceedings varied dramatically among federal judi-
cial districts within each sample state.64 Utilizing this and other
58 Id. at 316; see also id. at 313-14. The authors assume that significant lending took
place within two years before bankruptcy, when the debtors had "terrible debt/income
ratios." Id. at 314. From this, they apparently conclude that many creditors must not
consider debt/income ratios at all. Id. at 318.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 318-25.
61 The authors are well aware of this. See, e.g., id. at 200.
62 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
63 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 247.
64 Id at 18, 247.
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clues, 65 the authors contribute the valuable insight that "local legal
cultures," including the advice of local lawyers and judges, most
often account for a debtor choosing either Chapter 7 or 13, rather
than the economic costs and benefits of each chapter.66 This con-
clusion refutes the thesis that economic incentives necessarily affect
behavior and casts doubt upon Congress's assumption that it could
steer affluent debtors into Chapter 13 through economic induce-
ments. Despite such important contributions made possible by the
authors' methodology, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's data ob-
viously are not representative of conditions throughout the United
States. We must therefore be cautious in drawing any general con-
clusions about bankruptcy.
In addition, the data are somewhat dated; the project studied
1981 filings67 and therefore does not measure the effects of the
1984 or later amendments to the Reform Act. The authors can
hardly be criticized for this deficiency, however, considering the
time commitment involved in gathering and analyzing the data and
writing the book. Moreover, the study is still timely because its con-
clusion that few 1981 debtors in the sample abused bankruptcy of-
fers ammunition to those who suggest that the 1984 pro-creditor
amendments, still in force, were unnecessary or even wrong-
headed.68 Of course, data directly measuring the benefits and costs
of the 1984 reforms-Do they weed out the perhaps few offenders?
Do they increase the costs of adjudication? Do they turn away de-
serving debtors?-would better measure the wisdom of the 1984
amendments.
The authors' data disprove one common suspicion and confirm
another about the reasons debtors build up large amounts of debt,
which they are ultimately unable to pay. Crushing medical bills do
not appear to explain most bankruptcies. 69 Income interruptions,
on the other hand, apparently play a major role on the path to bank-
ruptcy. 70 Additional information concerning the causes of the inter-
65 For example, the authors found that debtors in states that exempt few assets
from Chapter 7 liquidation did not utilize Chapter 13 more frequently than debtors in
states with generous Chapter 7 exemptions. Id at 240-41.
66 Id at 246-52. Professor Whitford urges the abolition of Chapter 13 on the basis
of this data. See William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come To Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J.
85 (1989).
67 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
68 If fewer than 10% of debtors can pay their debts, tests such as whether a Chapter
7 discharge would be "substantial abuse," invite costly, but arguably unnecessary, judi-
cial intervention. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. In addition, the authors'
data contradict an assumption of the 1984 amendments that incentives, such as a more
generous discharge, DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 38, can induce debtors to file under Chap-
ter 13. Id. at 19; see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
69 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 168.
70 Id at 100. The authors concede, however, that less than 50% of the debtors
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ruptions-for example, how many debtors were fired and how many
unwisely terminated their employment themselves?-and about the
debtors' day-to-day budget decisions would help to complete the
picture of why debtors' circumstances result in bankruptcy.
The limits of the data also make Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook's test of ability to pay somewhat unpersuasive. As already
mentioned, the authors considered whether their wage earners
could repay in full in three years while living on a low budget. 71 The
authors use this approach primarily because of the uncertainties in-
herent in tests of less than full repayment. For example, Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook point out that it is impossible to ascertain
the portions of less than 100% repayment that debtors would apply
to secured and unsecured debt and, therefore, the amount of inter-
est that the debtors would have to pay on the secured debt.72 In
addition, the authors are wary of a test involving partial repayment
of Chapter 7 debt because some debtors in Chapter 7 already reaf-
firm some of their debts and make other informal repayments.
Without knowing the amounts of such actual repayments, the au-
thors believe that any data on partial repayment by Chapter 7 debt-
ors would be meaningless.7" Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook also
employ their test of complete repayment to Chapter 13 debtors be-
cause the authors did not follow these debtors until their cases were
closed.7 4 The authors therefore were unable to report the percent-
age of Chapter 13 debtors who actually successfully completed their
plans. 75
Notwithstanding the uncertainties inherent in Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook's own test of full repayment, 76 the results of their
inquiry convince that few debtors could pay even a substantial por-
tion of their debts. 77 I doubt, however, that the test results will per-
suade bankruptcy's critics that the 1984 amendments, designed to
police debtors, are useless. Many critics assert that debtors should
be required to attempt at least some repayment out of future earn-
ings. 78 To these analysts, a debtor may abuse bankruptcy if she re-
ceives a Chapter 7 discharge when she could pay 50% or even a
suffered income swings of more than 207 in the two years before bankruptcy. Id. at
101.
71 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
72 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 208-09.
73 Id. at 209-10.
74 See supra note 47.
75 Only 32%o of the debtors' plans had already failed at the time of the authors'
study. Id. at 215.
76 The authors build many assumptions into their test. See, e.g., supra note 46.
77 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 224.
78 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953
(1981). Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook admit that their conclusions are "laden with
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smaller percentage of her debts while living on a low budget. Obvi-
ously, data suggesting that most debtors cannot repay 100% of their
debts in three years will not deter these critics. In fact, these com-
mentators may turn the data against the authors and claim that if
about 9% of the Chapter 7 wage earners could repay 100% of their
debts in three years, many more could have repaid at least
something.79
Finally, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook conclude that the
credit industry could reduce bankruptcy losses by making more
careful lending decisions.80 They assert more than once that many
creditors fail to collect crucial information, such as the debtors' debt
burden, and fail to utilize properly the information they do gather.8 '
These conclusions, however, are not supported directly by empirical
data; the reader must accept them largely on faith.8 2
Despite the limits of the authors' data, As We Forgive Our Debtors
contributes a wealth of information about the plight of consumer
bankruptcy debtors. At minimum, the book shifts the burden of
proof to those who counsel the need for stricter bankruptcy entry
requirements to discourage abusive debtors.
III
CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE DECISIONS AND THE LIMrrs OF
EMPIRICAL DATA
Although Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook recognize that
some debtors are irresponsible,83 the reader cannot help but sus-
pect that the authors assign most of the blame for the explosion in
consumer bankruptcies to creditor lending strategies.8 4 After all,
normative assumptions" about how much debtors should be required to sacrifice. DEBT-
ORS, supra note 3, at 220; see Part III of this review.
79 Occasionally, the authors seem unduly influenced by their data. After reporting
their findings concerning ability to pay, the authors over-generalize that debtors "can-
not pay." See, e.g., DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 304. A few sentences later they qualify the
point by indicating that some debtors could repay a portion of their debts. Neverthe-
less, they surmise that many debtors are already repaying anyway; therefore, it would
not be worth the costs to "push" debtors to repay more. Id. at 304-05.
The authors also suggest that their repayment-plan figures present too favorable a
picture of the possibility of successful repayment, but they fail to point out that the
picture portrayed by their data also may be bleaker than reality. For example, they men-
tion that some of the 9% of debtors who seemingly have the ability to pay might encoun-
ter future misfortune and ultimately fail to repay as well. Id. at 212. But, by the same
reasoning, conditions also may improve for at least some of the 91% whom they believe
cannot pay.
80 Id. at 322-23.
81 E.g., id at 313, 316, 317.
82 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. For additional examples of the lim-
itations of the data, see supra notes 31-33, 41-42, 44-45, 70 and accompanying text.
83 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 11, 332.
84 See, e.g., id at 322-25.
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the authors describe a world of debtors earning a third less than
their counterparts in the same jobs, handcuffed by income interrup-
tions and a volatile economy, and unable to repay loans made by the
consumer credit industry without adequate investigation.8 5 Never-
theless, the authors concede that their data alone cannot determine
the appropriate legal approach to the consumer-debt problem. s6
To fashion a response, lawmakers must consider many normative
issues. As We Forgive Our Debtors helpfully frames these issues and
highlights this normative dimension of bankruptcy.8 7
The first question confronting social engineers is whether to re-
lieve obligors at all. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook assume the
propriety of a "safety valve ... to release the pressures" of a free
market economy.88 Although the reader may ultimately agree with
their conclusion, it is not self-evident. Lawmakers must consider the
host of moral, instrumental, and process concerns that govern our
law of obligations.8 9 For example, they must consider whether the
need to ensure the certainty and stability of such obligations out-
weighs the interest in relieving those who suffer from the dislocation
of changed circumstances. 90
Assuming that some relief is appropriate, is bankruptcy law the
correct vehicle? 91 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook acknowledge
that bankruptcy is only one of several measures that "soften the
stresses" of the market.92 With many alternatives at their disposal,
lawmakers must confront the dilemma of choosing the best ap-
proach or approaches. One possibility, for example, would be to
eliminate the bankruptcy discharge (while preserving bankruptcy's
distributional function).93 Instead, the law could protect people by
providing better job and catastrophe insurance. One obvious effect
of such a move would be to substitute taxpayers for creditors as the
85 "The bankruptcy laws are generally serving the people they are designed to
serve: people in serious, even hopeless financial trouble, who need either a fresh-start
discharge from their debts or at least some protection from their creditors and a breath-
ing spell while they try to repay." Id. at 77.
86 E.g., id. at 9, 220.
87 Id. at 9.
88 Id. at 334. "Every machine must have give in the joints or it will destroy itself,
and bankruptcy is part of the give in a free market society." Id.
89 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L.
REV. - (Nov. 1990) (forthcoming).
90 The authors nicely contrast our national dislike of broken pfomises with our alle-
giance to "[r]ebirth and a fresh start." DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 8.
91 "American law is by far the most generous in the world in granting discharges to
both individuals and businesses." Id at 334.
92 Id. at 328; see also id, at 333.
93 Bankruptcy's priority rules eliminate costly creditor rivalry. See Hillman, supra
note 89.
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group most directly bearing the burden of the debtors' default.94
Thig may appeal to those who do not condemn the creditors' lend-
ing practices. 95 Alternatively, lawmakers could create more effective
contract doctrines permitting reformation of contract obligations in
exigent circumstances. 96 This approach might be appropriate, for
example, when only one or a few obligations stymie a debtor and
bankruptcy would be costly and stigmatizing. Ultimately, resolving
which legal techniques to apply to consumer debt depends on the
overall costs and benefits of each solution. Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook could hardly be expected to supply information on the
costs and benefits of every possible approach to the debtors' crises.
Instead, As We Forgive Our Debtors initiates the inquiry by supplying
useful information relevant to bankruptcy's benefits and costs.
Assuming that bankruptcy discharge is an appropriate measure,
lawmakers still must consider whether they could improve this tech-
nique. Should bankruptcy incorporate a relatively bright-line rule
of discharge or should it utilize a standard that invites case-by-case
judicial analysis? The debate about the propriety of rules and stan-
dards, of course, is not new.97 Rules reduce the costs of administra-
tion but increase the possibility of injustice in individual cases;
standards alleviate the latter concern but invite inconsistent applica-
tion and increase the costs of adjudication. The "substantial abuse"
and "disposable income" tests of the 1984 amendments evidence a
move toward utilizing standards in bankruptcyjurisprudence. 98 Sul-
livan, Warren, and Westbrook criticize such tests, however, on the
traditional grounds mentioned above.99
In addition to questions pertaining to the bankruptcy process,
reformers confront substantive improvement questions. For exam-
ple, does bankruptcy require the appropriate amount of debtor sac-
rifice, or are too many debtors abusing the law? Debtor "sacrifice"
encompasses at least the following issues. Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook's data demonstrate that couples in bankruptcy are typi-
94 Creditors, of course, may raise interest rates to absorb the losses of bankruptcy
so that all borrowers would pay for the losses.
95 See infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKE LJ. 1.
97 For a discussion of the paradox of rules and standards in the context of bank-
ruptcy, see generally Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the
Histoiy of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986).
98 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
99 The authors characterize the substantial abuse test as "vague," which permits
judges to apply it inconsistently. DEBTORS supra note 3, at 33; see also id. at 221. Further,
they criticize an inquiry as to why both spouses are not working when a family seeks a
discharge, viewing it as "intrusive and expensive." Id. at 159.
1990] 1107
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
cally earning only one income. 100 Should spouses be required to
work to help pay debts?10 1 Should debtors be required to repay at
least some of their debts from future earnings? 10 2 What is the ap-
propriate minimum budget for debtors? Should the concept of sac-
rifice be tied to the parties' fault in creating the debt? For that
matter, what conduct is blameworthy? "Sacrifice," "abuse," and
"blameworthiness" are value-laden concepts; lawmakers' ap-
proaches to these issues inevitably shape the parameters of the
bankruptcy safety net. 10 3 Despite their overall outlook, Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook are ambivalent on some of these issues.
For example, although the authors contribute the important point
that income interruptions affect many debtors prior to bankruptcy,
they occasionally refer to debtors as "irresponsible."' 1 4 Moreover,
their view on creditor practices is somewhat unclear.
Suppose a creditor concludes that the costs of evaluating
whether debtors are bad credit risks outweigh the gains, and mar-
kets credit without investigating an overeager debtor's balance
sheet. 10 5 Has the creditor engaged in commendable cost-benefit
analysis and marketing techniques, or has the creditor unduly influ-
enced a consumer addicted to consumption? 0 6 Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook helpfully discuss why creditors may not engage in a
more comprehensive investigation of their debtors. The authors ex-
plain that security interests, 10 7 reaffirmations,108 Chapter 13 repay-
ment plans, and other informal repayments may reduce outstanding
debt to a level that renders additional precautions inefficient.' 0 9
Creditors who decide to make high-risk loans without precautions,
the authors surmise, may be making "entirely reasonable business
decisions."'10
100 Id. at 157.
101 Id. at 158-59.
102 See id. at 299. In other words, should Chapter 13 be mandatory? Whether an
affirmative answer would swing the pendulum too far in favor of creditor interests is the
subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 78, at 976-91; Steven L.
Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327,
345-64 (1982); see also Whitford, supra note 66.
103 See DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 8.
104 E.g., id. at 8, 11.
105 See id. at 302-25.
106 See id.; see also Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 770 (1989) ("an inference of systematic exploitation of consum-
ers ... simply does not seem justified by the current evidence").
107 The average debtor in the authors' sample was indebted to 15 creditors of which
3 were secured creditors. DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 31.
108 About 19% of the authors' Chapter 7 debtors reaffirmed at least one of their
debts. Id. at 32.
109 Id. at 319-20. The authors estimate that "industry exposure" was about $2 bil-
lion in 1981, which is less than 1% of outstanding consumer debt that year. Id. at 320.
110 Id. at 321. For example, stores were the largest unsecured lenders in the au-
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Without much elaboration, however, Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook ultimately assert that lending without precautions is "ir-
responsible"'1 l and worry that the practice probably increases the
amount of consumer debt." 2 Perhaps influenced by contract law
solidarity norms such as the duties of care and disclosure, 1 3 or per-
suaded on instrumental grounds that only creditors can contain spi-
raling and costly consumer debt, the authors believe that
"responsible" lenders should police their prospective debtors.
Such lenders should deny credit to those, although in poor financial
shape, who are unable to withstand the pressures of our consump-
tion-oriented society. A likely result of increased surveillance by the
lending industry, of course, would be the reduction of available
credit. 114 Ironically, the result of "responsible" lending therefore
might be a reduced standard of living for those debtors suffering the
plight brought home in Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's impor-
tant book. 15
thors' sample. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. The costs of these creditors
requiring detailed credit applications may legitimately preclude the practice.
I11 IE at 325. The authors also refer to the "pathology" of the consumer credit
industry, id. at 3, and the "reckless" dispensing of credit cards. Id. at 188.
112 Id. at 324-25. There is some debate, however, concerning whether rising debt is
a cause for concern. Id. at 331; see also Lisa J. McIntyre, A Sociological Perspective on Bank-
ruptcy, 65 IND. LJ. 123, 124-25 (1989).
113 See generally Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (1983).
114 DEBTORS, supra note 3, at 323; see also id. at 290, 316. For helpful suggestions as
to how Congress could construct disincentives to excessive lending, see Girth, supra note
21, at 55-57.
115 On the other hand, perhaps debtors will be better off by avoiding high-interest
credit. Id. at 323.
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